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JUDGING THOMAS RUFFIN AND THE
HINDSIGHT DEFENSE*
ERIC L. MULLER**
Judge Thomas Ruffin of the antebellum Supreme Court of North
Carolina enjoys the reputation as one of the great judges of the
nineteenth century; some rank him among the greats of all
American history. This reputation has been little tarnished by his
authorship of State v. Mann, an opinion that has become one of
the central texts of the American law of slavery due to its savage
endorsement of the right of the temporary hirer of a slave to
shoot her in the back without risking criminal sanction.
Scholars have hesitated to condemn Judge Ruffin for his Mann
opinion. To some extent, this is because Ruffin professed great
personal anguish in that opinion at the harshness of its outcome.
In addition, the archival record seemed to contain few clues
(beyond the Mann opinion itself) about Ruffin's attitudes toward
slavery and his own slaves. Finally, and relatedly, scholars have
wished to honor what the Article calls the "hindsight defense" of
historical actors-the claim that present observers cannot fairly
assess the behavior of figures from the past because they will
inevitably ignore the culture and morals of that earlier time.
This Article presents newly discovered archival evidence that
places Judge Ruffin and his Mann opinion in a much more
troublesome light. The evidence reveals Ruffin to have been a
batterer of slaves, a speculating slave trader at a time when that
trade had become disreputable, and a serial breaker of slave
families. These new disclosures not only force a reconsideration
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of Judge Ruffin and his Mann opinion, but also suggest that the
"hindsight defense" of historical actors is often excessively
simplistic and reductionist.
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INTRODUCTION
When Thomas Ruffin died at the age of eighty-three on January
15, 1870, the obituarists outdid themselves. "[A]s a jurist and Chief
Justice of North Carolina," said the Raleigh Sentinel, Ruffin's "fame
ha[d] gone abroad in the land, across the great waters;" with his death,
"the whole state and humanity itself" had "lost something ... of the
dignity and prestige of the Judiciary."1 "In all the history of North
Carolina there has not lived or died a better man,"2 opined the North
Carolina Standard. "He is not only a loss to his family and friends but
to the whole country," said Ruffin's hometown newspaper, the
Hillsborough Recorder, which also expressed the hope that the
"example of his life" and "the truth of his opinions" would "prove a
voice, speaking from the tomb for the good of his country and the
happiness of mankind."3
Nevermind that the "example of [Ruffin's] life" included not just
owning human beings but trafficking in them, battering somebody
else's slave for giving him a look that he did not like, and repeatedly
1. Obituary, Thomas Ruffin, THE SENTINEL (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 19, 1870, at 4,
reprinted in 4 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS RUFFIN 229, 230 (J.G. de Roulhac Hamilton ed.,
1920).
2. Obituary, Thomas Ruffin, THE NORTH CAROLINA STANDARD, Jan. 18, 1870,
at 2.
3. The Death of Judge Ruffin, THE HILLSBOROUGH RECORDER, Jan. 26, 1870, at 3.
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separating husbands from wives and parents from children.4
Nevermind that the opinions whose truth the obituaries praised
included Ruffin's opinion in State v. Mann,5 which went out of its way
to bolster a slave owner's "uncontrolled authority over the body" of
his slave,6 and Cannon v. Jenkins,' which volunteered, in dictum, that
an estate executor ought to break up a slave family if separate sales
would bring a higher price.8 These facets of Ruffin's life did not
matter to his contemporaries-or at least those who wrote his
eulogies.
Neither, apparently, did they matter to those who commissioned
a statue of Ruffin in 1915 and placed it at the entrance to the Court of
Appeals of North Carolina,9 or to those at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill who named a new dormitory to honor him in
1922.10 Nor did they seem to matter to Harvard Law School Dean
Roscoe Pound, who, as late as 1936, identified Thomas Ruffin as one
of the "great judges of the formative era of our law."'"
Only in recent years has Ruffin's authorship of State v. Mann
come to diminish his reputation. But scholars have trodden
tentatively. Its title notwithstanding, Sally Hadden's important essay
Judging Slavery: Thomas Ruffin and State v. Mann 12 offers little in
the way of judgment. Hadden did valuable work in Ruffin's archived
writings, work that revealed Ruffin as a sterner, more cold-hearted
person and slave owner than scholars had thought. 3  Hadden
nonetheless accepted Ruffin's claim that he truly "lamented" the
brutality of slavery and concluded that Ruffin "understood slavery's
4. See infra Part V.
5. 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829).
6. Id. at 266.
7. 16 N.C. (1 Dev. Eq.) 422 (1830).
8. Id. at 426.
9. See Sally Greene, Judge Thomas Ruffin and the Shadows of Southern History, in
COMMEMORATION AND THE AMERICAN CITY: ESSAYS ON MONUMENTS,
MEMORIALIZATION, AND MEANING (David Gobel & Daves Rossell eds., forthcoming
2009).
10. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Carolina Story-Names Across the
Landscape: Thomas Ruffin, http://museum.unc.edu/exhibits/names/thomas-ruffin-1787-
1870-and-ruffin-residence-hall (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
11. See ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 84 (1938).
Pound delivered his opinion of Ruffin in a lecture in 1936; that lecture was published in
1938. Id. at vi-vii.
12. Sally Hadden, Judging Slavery: Thomas Ruffin and State v. Mann, in LOCAL
MATTERS: RACE, CRIME, AND JUSTICE IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH 1-28
(Christopher Waldrep & Donald C. Nieman eds., 2001).
13. See id. at 6-11.
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basic immorality."' 4 Similarly, in his seminal work Slave Law in the
American South, Mark Tushnet accepted Ruffin's professions of
anguish at the outcome of State v. Mann as demonstrations of
"candor" and Southern "honor."' 5  Only Sanford Levinson has
explicitly called the question of out-and-out judging Thomas Ruffin
for his authorship of State v. Mann.6 And he did not answer the
question he called. 7
There is a reason for this reluctance to judge Thomas Ruffin that
goes beyond the sense among historians that it is not their
professional role to assign blame to figures from the past. 8 That
reason is what might be termed the "hindsight defense" of historical
figures. Writing fourteen years ago, Sanford Levinson put the point
clearly: "It is, of course, a cheap thrill to denounce Ruffin ... from
the safety of a 1995 perspective."' 9 The hindsight defense posits that
we cannot fairly or accurately judge historical figures because we
inevitably do so by reference to the morality and customs of our own
day rather than the morality and customs of theirs. It is a common,
almost instinctive, objection that gets voiced whenever someone calls
attention to the darker sides of our American heroes. It was, for
example, Wyoming Senator Malcolm Wallop's reaction when
Congress considered an apology and reparations payments for
Franklin Roosevelt's wartime incarceration of Japanese Americans:
"[T]o superimpose the peacetime mentality of today on the past and
to judge our predecessors on that account is ... '[t]he hindsight
wisdom of a Monday morning quarterback.' "20
In this Article, I will argue against the hindsight objection, both
as a general proposition and specifically in the case of Thomas Ruffin.
First, as a general matter, the hindsight objection rests on a simplistic
idea of what any particular moment actually represents in the course
of a society's history. The hindsight objection conceives of historical
moments as monoliths-times in which "people" believed or thought
a particular thing or acted in a particular way. Yet on most matters of
14. Id. at 18.
15. MARK TUSHNET, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH: STATE V. MANN IN
HISTORY AND LITERATURE 93-96 (2003).
16. See Sanford Levinson, Allocating Honor and Acting Honorably: Some Reflections
Provoked by the Cardozo Conference on Slavery, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1969, 1969 (1996).
17. See id. at 1969, 1980.
18. See TREVOR BURNARD, MASTERY, TYRANNY & DESIRE: THOMAS
THISTLEWOOD AND His SLAVES IN THE ANGLO-JAMAICAN WORLD 31 (2004) ("As
historians, it is not our responsibility to attribute retrospective blame.").
19. Levinson, supra note 16, at 1975.
20. 134 CONG. REC. 7608, 7615 (1988) (statement of Sen. Wallop).
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later consequence, this is often verifiably false; careful examination of
history often reveals considerable diversity of opinion and practice
and the possibility of meaningful, and morally consequential, choice.
Second, whatever the abstract merits of the hindsight objection,
Thomas Ruffin is in a uniquely poor position to avail himself of it. In
drafting his opinion in State v. Mann, Ruffin turned his gaze directly
to readers who were outside what he understood as his own
framework. State v. Mann was exquisitely aware of the certainty of
judgment by outsiders; Ruffin expected that judgment and crafted an
opinion that would respond to and defend against it. And even more
to the point, Ruffin enlisted the passage of time as a rhetorical and
substantive weapon in State v. Mann: the opinion depended on
Ruffin's confident prediction that a future generation would see the
rightness of his judgment. Having invoked the passage of time as his
sword in State v. Mann, Ruffin should not be heard to raise it as a
shield.
And third, even if we entertain a hindsight objection tendered on
Ruffin's behalf, that objection is invalid on its merits. The archives
contain a good deal more evidence about Thomas Ruffin's views and
practices concerning slaves and slavery than scholars have heretofore
uncovered. This new material reveals that Ruffin's personal
"lamentations" about the harsh outcome of State v. Mann likelier
reflected posturing than honest confession. The full archival record
shows that Thomas Ruffin was not among the better men of his time
and place on matters relating to slavery and that he may have been
among the worst.
I. STATE V. MANN AND THE CURIOUSLY STURDY REPUTATION OF
THOMAS RUFFIN
Thomas Ruffin is seen differently today from how he was seen at
the time his obituaries appeared in North Carolina newspapers. To
his contemporaries, or at least those of his race and class, Ruffin was
a figure of towering accomplishment, and his memory retained that
aura for at least seven decades.21 Today, he is a figure of discomfort.
Scholars struggle to reconcile his many accomplishments with his
authorship of State v. Mann, perhaps the coldest and starkest defense
of the physical violence inherent in slavery that ever appeared in an
21. The glowing evaluation of Ruffin by Dean Roscoe Pound, cited in supra note 11,
came in 1936, nearly seventy years after Ruffin's death. See TUSHNET, supra note 15, at
2009]
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American judicial opinion.22 To say the least, State v. Mann has
complicated the narrative of an American legal hero.
Notably, though, State v. Mann has not come close to destroying
that narrative. Ruffin remains a celebrated figure. His imposing
statue still greets every visitor to the Court of Appeals of North
Carolina. Each year, ninety-five students at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill live in a dormitory that bears his name. The
local chapter of the international legal fraternity Phi Alpha Delta at
the university is the Ruffin Chapter. While Ruffin's portrait does not
hang on the walls of the university's law school, it does adorn the
chamber of the campus's Dialectic Society.
Ironically, part of the durability of Ruffin's reputation comes
from the very thing that most tarnishes it: the opinion in State v.
Mann. Others have analyzed the Mann opinion with great
sophistication," so only the briefest of summaries is needed here.24
John Mann leased the slave Lydia from her owner for the year 1828.25
When she committed what the reported opinion calls "some small
offense," Mann began to "chastise" her. 26 Lydia ran off during the
punishment. Mann shot her in the back as she ran, wounding but
not killing her.28 It was already settled North Carolina law that a
stranger to a slave-that is, a person not the slave's owner-could be
indicted for the crime of battery in a situation of this sort.29 On the
other hand, as Sally Hadden reports, "[l]ocal officials rarely
intervened when an owner struck or shot a slave."3 John Mann was
neither a stranger to Lydia nor was he her true owner; he was a
leaseholder. State v. Mann therefore appeared to present the legal
22. The scholarly conference that spawned the articles published in this symposium,
"The Perils of Public Memory: State v. Mann and Thomas Ruffin in History and
Memory," held at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill on November 16, 2007,
testifies to the difficulty of squaring Ruffin's celebrated memory with his authorship of
Mann.
23. The most noteworthy analysis is undoubtedly Mark Tushnet's. See TUSHNET,
supra note 15, at 20-37.
24. The facts I relate come from The Supreme Court of North Carolina's opinion.
However, Sally Greene's contribution to this symposium, State v. Mann Exhumed, 87 N.C.
L. REV. 701, 707-27 (2009), presents new archival evidence that significantly expands our
understanding of the case.
25. State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263,263 (1829).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See State v. Hale, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 582, 584 (1823) (finding there is "as much
reason" for making a stranger's battery of a slave indictable "as if a white man had been
the victim").
30. Hadden, supra note 12, at 9.
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question of whether, under the common law, the leaseholder of a
slave could be indicted for the crime of battery.
Judge Ruffin did not cast the question so narrowly, however; he
did not choose to draw what might seem an inviting distinction
between a person who owned a slave and a person who merely leased
a slave. He reported instead that the law "uniformly" treated "the
hirer and possessor of a slave" as, "for the time being, the owner" for
the purposes of both "rights and duties."31 As Judge Ruffin shaped it,
the case therefore presented the question of whether a slave owner-
temporary or permanent-could be indicted for the common-law
crime of battery for using excessive physical force against his slave.32
Judge Ruffin held that he could not. Slaves could be compelled
to a lifetime of work only if they lacked independent will, and the
only way to strip them of that will was to confer on the slave's owner
an "uncontrolled authority over [her] body."33 As Ruffin memorably
put it, "[tlhe power of the master must be absolute to render the
submission of the slave perfect."34 And that power insulated the
owner from criminal responsibility even for "instances of cruelty and
deliberate barbarity."3 5 The legislature might, if it wished, "interpose
express enactments to the contrary;" that is, it might pass a statute
clearly extending the scope of the crime of battery to cover a slave
owner. 36 But a court-that is to say, Judge Thomas Ruffin-could not
do so through a judicial opinion.
This was a cold outcome, to be sure: a man shoots a woman in
the back, and a judge refuses to hold him accountable. But Judge
Ruffin protected himself from judgment by studding the opinion with
confessions of his personal distaste for the outcome and of the
distress that the case had brought him. The confessional tone began
with Judge Ruffin's very first line: "A Judge cannot but lament when
such cases as the present are brought into judgment. ' 37  And it
continued all the way through to the opinion's final paragraph, in
which Judge Ruffin reported that he "would gladly have avoided th[e]
ungrateful question" that the case presented.38 In between this
opening and this closing, Judge Ruffin repeatedly bared what he
31. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 265.
32. See id. at 264-65.
33. Id. at 266.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 267.
36. See id. at 268.
37. Id. at 264.
38. Id. at 268.
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reported to be his anguish. He wrote that the case opened a "severe"
"struggle" in his "own breast" between his "feelings [as a] man" and
his "duti[es as a] Magistrate."39 And he "most freely confess[ed his]
sense of the harshness of th[e] proposition" that he used the case to
establish.4" "I feel it as deeply as any man can," Judge Ruffin wrote.4'
But all of this personal distress was beside the point. With
"reluctance," Ruffin claimed, he was "compelled to express an
opinion upon the extent of the dominion of the master over the slave
in North Carolina.
42
Judge Ruffin's tone of self-disclosure appears to have succeeded
in blunting personal criticism in his own day. Harriet Beecher Stowe,
no friend of slavery or its defenders, was quite taken with Ruffin's
profession of anguish. In The Key to Uncle Tom's Cabin, Stowe
wrote of State v. Mann and its author that one could not "read th[e]
decision, so fine and clear in expression, so dignified and solemn in its
earnestness, and so dreadful in its results, without feeling at once
respect for the man and horror for the system. '43 "[J]udging [Ruffin]
from the short specimen" of the opinion in State v. Mann, Stowe
concluded that he had "one of that high order of minds which looks
straight through all verbiage and sophistry to the heart of every
subject which it encounters."' Stowe accepted Ruffin's claim that the
law left him with no choice but the outcome that so pained him: he
was a man of "honor," of "humanity," and of "the kindest and
gentlest feeling" who was "obliged to interpret these severe laws with
inflexible severity. 45
Francis Nash, a prominent North Carolina lawyer of the
generation that followed Ruffin's, proved himself equally unfazed by
State v. Mann in his biography of Ruffin that appeared in the
Charlotte Observer in 1905.46 "As a judge," wrote Nash, Ruffin's
''excellence was supreme"-on par with that of Chief Justice John
39. Id. at 264.
40. Id. at 266.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 264.
43. HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, THE KEY TO UNCLE TOM'S CABIN 147 (1853)
[hereinafter STOWE, THE KEY TO UNCLE TOM'S CABIN]; see also 1 HARRIET BEECHER
STOWE, SUNNY MEMORIES OF FOREIGN LANDS 261 (1854) ("It always seemed to me that
there was a certain severe strength and grandeur about [the opinion in State v. Mann]
which approached to the heroic.").
44. STOWE, THE KEY TO UNCLE TOM'S CABIN, supra note 43, at 147-48.
45. Id. at 133.
46. Francis Nash, Chief Justice Thomas Ruffin, in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS RUFFIN
35, 39 (J.G. de Roulhac Hamilton ed., 1918).
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Marshall." His opinions were notable for "their breadth of view,
fullness of discussion, the battle-axe force of their reasoning, the
strength of their language, and the almost inevitable character of their
conclusions."48  In support of this characterization, Nash cited
Ruffin's opinion in State v. Boyce,49 in which the court held that a
slave owner could not be charged with the crime of maintaining a
disorderly house for allowing his slaves to dance and sing on
Christmas Eve.5" In his essay, Nash included-but was apparently not
troubled by-Ruffin's comment that these "noisy outpourings of glad
hearts" were God's blessing on slaves, creatures with "corporeal
vigor" but "vacant mind[s]."'" Nash did not, however, cite State v.
Mann as evidence of Ruffin's "battle-axe" logic and "inevitable"
conclusions. In fact, he did not mention Mann at all.
Neither did Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe Pound mention
Mann in 1936, when he listed Thomas Ruffin as one of the great
common-law judges in United States history.52 In Pound's eyes,
Mann presumably did not detract from Ruffin's excellence in
regularly satisfying what Pound identified as the three criteria of great
judging: "reasoned application of the law the judges receive from a
tradition; responsiveness to the need to adapt the law to new
circumstances; and attention to the role of judicial decisions as
precedent. ,13
Historian Julius Yanuck did include State v. Mann in his
important 1955 article "Thomas Ruffin and North Carolina Slave
Law," but Mann did not detract from the author's assessment of
Ruffin's Chief Judgeship as a time of amelioration in the slave law of
the state. 4 Ruffin's position in Mann was harsh, Yanuck conceded, 55
but several things tempered it: Ruffin's "deep aversion '56 to its
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 32 N.C. (10 Ired.) 536 (1849).
50. Id. at 541.
51. Id.
52. See POUND, supra note 11, at 4.
53. TUSHNET, supra note 15, at 74-75. Martin H. Brinkley's "brief history" of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina that appears on the court system's website echoes this
assessment, saying nothing at all about State v. Mann or Ruffin's contributions to the law
of slavery. See Martin H. Brinkley, Supreme Court of North Carolina: A Brief History,
http://www.aoc.state.nc.uswww/copyright/scfacts.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
54. Julius Yanuck, Thomas Ruffin and North Carolina Slave Law, 21 J. S. HIST. 456,
475 (1955).
55. Id. at 462.
56. Id.
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"unpleasant 5 7 outcome, the "sincere personal distaste"" that Ruffin
felt for the result that logic commanded, and especially the fact that
Ruffin was "himself the most moral of men"5 who was "humane
toward his slaves."6 Mann permitted needless violence against slaves
under the guise of "correction," but Yanuck, who found in Ruffin's
papers "no ill-treatment of slaves,"61 was confident-erroneously, as
will soon become clear-that "it was ... unthinkable that Ruffin and
the many planters of his status in society would ordinarily avail
themselves of the full latitude permitted them in correcting their
slaves."62
And as noted earlier, even the leading recent work on Ruffin,
while offering a more clear-eyed view of Mann's place in Ruffin's
career, has taken Ruffin's professions of anguish more or less at face
value. Sally Hadden reported herself "skeptical" that Thomas
Ruffin's professed "paternalism" toward slaves was "sincere" or
"more than skin-deep"63 but nonetheless accepted that Ruffin
"lament[ed] the brutality of slavery" and "understood slavery's basic
immorality."'  Mark Tushnet, too, accepted that Ruffin "believed
that absolute dominion [of master over slave] was indeed morally
repugnant"65 and that Ruffin's "statements of regret" in State v. Mann
came from the judge's firm commitment to "developing a sound rule
of law" notwithstanding the presence in the case of contrary
"circumstances" that he would have found "appealing."66
The subject matter of State v. Mann was obviously volatile. The
care with which Thomas Ruffin honed the language of the opinion
through three complete drafts reflects his awareness of the opinion's
sensitivity.67 By lacing the opinion with confessions of personal
anguish and moral discomfort, Ruffin built a firewall against our
judgment. That firewall has weakened over 180 years, but it has not
crumbled.
57. Id. at 463.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 466.
60. Id. at 474.
61. Id. at 475.
62. Id. at 473-74.
63. Hadden, supra note 12, at 8.
64. Id. at 18.
65. TUSHNET, supra note 15, at 63.
66. Id. at 84.
67. The three drafts appear in 4 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS RUFFIN, supra note 1, at
249-57.
[Vol. 87
JUDGING THOMAS RUFFIN
II. STATE V. MANN AND THE HINDSIGHT DEFENSE
Confessed anguish is not the only thing that has kept State v.
Mann from swamping Thomas Ruffin's reputation. So too has the
passage of time. Slavery ended a few decades after Ruffin wrote his
opinion; the culture that sustained the institution withered after
slavery's demise. In the United States today, slavery is outlawed, its
culture foreign and unfamiliar.
We are therefore doubly reluctant to judge Judge Ruffin for his
authorship of State v. Mann: not only did he confess to us his
personal discomfort over the harshness of the decision, but he lived in
an earlier world so different from our own that we fear we cannot
judge him fairly. We have the benefit of hindsight, something that
Thomas Ruffin of necessity lacked. Thus, as we consider the case of
Thomas Ruffin, he stands before us with a well-pled "hindsight
defense."
An especially eloquent articulation of the hindsight defense of
historical figures is that of the nineteenth-century British politician
and historian Thomas Babington Macaulay. In 1835, Macaulay
published a review of an edited publication of Sir James Mackintosh's
History of the Revolution in England.68 Macaulay's review praised
Mackintosh but faulted the volume's unnamed editor for "the
contempt with which [he thought] fit to speak of all things that were
done before the coming in of the very last fashions in politics."69 This
error, Macaulay wrote, was "as pernicious as almost any error
concerning the transactions of a past age can possibly be."7 To "form
a correct estimate" of the "merits" of a prior generation, Macaulay
argued that "we ought to place ourselves in their situation, to put out
of our minds, for a time, all that knowledge which they, however
eager in the pursuit of truth, could not have, and which we, however
negligent we may have been, could not help having."71
"Undoubtedly," Macaulay conceded, "it is among the first duties of a
historian to point out the faults of the eminent men of former
generations."72 But as a matter of fairness, historians owe it to those
eminent men to strip away hindsight and see the world as their
68. THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, Sir James Mackintosh, in II CRITICAL AND
HISTORICAL ESSAYS BY LORD MACAULAY 283 (1901).
69. Id. at 300.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 302.
72. Id. at 305-06.
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subjects saw it. "As we would have our descendants judge us,"
Macaulay memorably argued, "so ought we to judge our fathers. '73
Thomas Ruffin cited his supposedly anguished feelings to stave
off judgment for the harshness of the outcome in State v. Mann. Yet
we can also read Ruffin's Mann opinion as subtly invoking the
hindsight defense in its first few sentences:
A Judge cannot but lament, when such cases as the present are
brought into judgment. It is impossible that the reasons on
which they go can be appreciated, but where institutions similar
to our own exist and are thoroughly understood. The struggle,
too, in the Judge's own breast between the feelings of the man,
and the duty of the magistrate is a severe one, presenting strong
temptation to put aside such questions, if it be possible.74
It is often assumed that what Thomas Ruffin chiefly "lamented" was
the pathos of the case-the "distasteful" nature of the assault on
Lydia and the chasm that the case opened up "between 'the Judge'
and 'the man.' ,71 But that is not precisely what Ruffin said. What
Ruffin actually said he "lamented" was the inevitability of
judgment-the certainty that his opinion (and, by extension, its
author) would be misunderstood and condemned by people
unfamiliar with its context. Ruffin lamented his own position, not
Lydia's. The emotional struggle between feeling and duty was also
severe, but Ruffin's insertion of the word "too" makes plain that this
struggle was a distinct difficulty from the one that he chiefly
"lamented."
Mark Tushnet is undoubtedly right that Ruffin was primarily
glancing northward when he predicted that his reasons would not be
"appreciated" in places where "institutions similar to [his] own" did
not exist.76  But the sentence also might be a glance toward the
future-toward a reader of a later day such as ours, in which
"institutions similar to [his day's] own" no longer "exist" and are no
73. Id. at 302. For an articulation of the hindsight defense, see Kim Forde-Mazrui,
Taking Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative Action and
Reparations, 92 CAL. L. REV. 683, 711 (2004) ("During the period in which state and
federal laws sanctioned slavery and discrimination, a majority of Americans presumably
believed these practices were not immoral, at least not intolerably so. To hold now, in
hindsight, that society committed immoral acts would impose on society an obligation
based on conduct that has only become widely accepted as immoral after its occurrence. It
is arguably unfair to blame society based on moral standards not yet established at the
time of the purported wrongdoing.").
74. State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 264 (1829) (emphasis added).
75. TUSHNET, supra note 15, at 26.
76. See id. at 26-27.
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longer "thoroughly understood." In a closely related passage of State
v. Mann, Ruffin "most freely confess[ed] [his] sense of the harshness
of the proposition" the opinion established; intriguingly, he said that
as a moral proposition, it was one that "every person in his retirement
must repudiate."77 In the language of his time, the verb "retire" had a
double sense: it meant "to withdraw into seclusion," but it also had
the temporal connotation we think of today-a withdrawal from an
office or business toward life's end to enjoy greater leisure.7" Thus, in
the word "retirement," we can perhaps sense a touch of anxiety in
Ruffin about how his judgment would look not just to observers from
a different place, but to observers from a later time.
The hindsight defense has worked well for Thomas Ruffin. Even
Sanford Levinson, a scholar so horrified by Mann as to ask whether
Ruffin's portrait deserves to hang in honor on the walls of an
American law school, gave the hindsight defense its due. "[T]o
denounce Ruffin ... from the safety of a 1995 perspective," Levinson
argued in that year, was but a "cheap thrill."79 In the balance of this
Article, I will argue that there is nothing "cheap" in denouncing
Ruffin from the safety of the present. Not only are the merits of the
hindsight defense overstated as a general matter, but Thomas Ruffin
arrives in today's world poorly positioned to assert it.
III. THE DANGEROUS GENERALITY OF THE HINDSIGHT DEFENSE
"The past is a foreign country: they do things differently
there."8 This is the first sentence of L.P. Hartley's 1953 novel The
Go-Between, but we might also take it as a statement of the central
idea of the hindsight defense. The hindsight defense depends on the
notion that a historical figure lived not just in a different moment
from our own but in a wholly different moral context-a moment of
culture, belief, and practice so different from the present as to make
judgment perilous if not impossible. Insofar as the hindsight defense
reminds us that the past differs from the present, it has some value.
On the other hand, insofar as the hindsight defense subtly
suggests that the past was a monolith, it is usually false and
misleading. To put the point in L.P. Hartley's language, we must
remember that the foreign country of the past is in fact a whole
country: a big place where different people thought about and did
77. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 266 (emphasis added).
78. See XIII OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 782 (1989).
79. Levinson, supra note 16, at 1975.
80. L.P. HARTLEY, THE Go-BETWEEN 9 (1953).
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many things in different and conflicting ways. In debates about the
contested beliefs and practices of some segment of the population of
a particular historical era, the hindsight defense, therefore, offers us
very little and needlessly deters us from judgment. Careful
consideration of the merits and demerits of a historical figure should
press beyond the hindsight defense to focus on the choices that the
historical figure made from within the broad range of views, beliefs,
and behaviors of his day.
A personal anecdote might help illustrate the way the hindsight
defense tends to depict the past. When I was in high school, I read
something about the devastation wrought at Hiroshima and Nagasaki
by our two atomic bombs. In a conversation that evening with my
grandmother, who parented my mother alone during the war while
my grandfather served in the U.S. Navy, I expressed a teenager's
outrage that my country could have inflicted so much suffering on so
many innocent civilians. My grandmother flashed with impatience.
"You don't understand," she said, "and you don't know what it was
like. Times were different then. People were scared and had made a
lot of sacrifices. People thought the bombs were necessary. There
was no other way to win the war."" l
I would imagine that many people have had similar exchanges
with parents or grandparents upon learning of some arguable blemish
on the memory of an earlier generation. The broad assertion that
"times were different" is an understandable response to defend the
memory and reputation of that earlier generation. It appears
everywhere-not just in private family discourse. It is, for example,
the view that Alan Simpson voiced on the floor of the United States
Senate two decades ago during the debate over an apology for the
Japanese American internment. "[A]t that time," said Simpson, "in
most every structure of our citizenry, or [sic] Government and our
bureaucracy, [internment] seemed the very right thing to do."82
The trouble with this understandable sort of response is that it is
often demonstrably oversimplified. Consider Alan Simpson's
recollection that internment seemed "right" in "most every structure
of our citizenry, [our] Government, and our bureaucracy."83 This is
false. The government's policy of excluding Japanese Americans
81. I mention this anecdote not to join issue on the debate over whether the United
States was justified in dropping either or both of those two atomic bombs, but to illustrate
a common claim about the monolithic and unanimous nature of past judgments and
events.
82. 134 CONG. REC. 7608,7615 (1988) (statement of Sen. Simpson).
83. Id.
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from the West Coast and detaining them en masse did not seem the
right thing to do to the Attorney General of the United States, the
Director of the FBI, a third of the Justices of the Supreme Court of
the United States, many respected public intellectuals, and many
newspaper editorialists of the time. 4 The truth is that among those
paying attention to the issues, support for exclusion and internment
was not the monolith that Senator Simpson recalled. 5 These policies
were choices that government officials made from among an array of
options debated at the highest and most central levels of government
and public opinion.
The point emerges even more clearly if we think about our own
society and how the true range and nuance of our views might be
characterized by the generations that will follow us. Suppose that
many decades from now an American politician, speaking of the U.S.
detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, urges the Americans of his day
to remember that the Americans of our day were frightened by the
attacks of September 11, 2001, and therefore thought Guantanamo
necessary to combat terrorism. The politician might point to the
overwhelming support that the President received for the military
effort against al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Authorization to Use
Military Force of September 18, 2001,6 and infer in his own mind that
Guantanamo was one of a package of measures against terrorism that
"the American people" wanted and supported. But do you find this
an accurate characterization of the true range of American thought
and feeling on Guantanamo, in particular, or on the appropriate
balance between civil liberties and national security more generally?
This thought experiment about how future generations will be
tempted to reduce ours to a monolith helps us see more clearly how
the hindsight defense tempts us to a monolithic and falsely simplistic
understanding of the past.
Thomas Ruffin's opinion in State v. Mann is just as powerful an
illustration of the uselessness of the hindsight defense in a careful
judgment of a historical figure. While a defender of Ruffin might
claim that his reasoning in State v. Mann was a simple product of its
time and culture rather than a contestable choice, nearly everything
84. See Eric L. Muller, Fixing a Hole: How the Criminal Law Can Bolster Reparations
Theory, 47 B.C. L. REV. 659, 695-701 (2006).
85. It is worth noting that Senator Simpson was a boy of ten when the exclusion and
internment of Japanese Americans commenced and can, for that reason, be excused for
misperceiving the unanimity of support for the program.
86. Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
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about the case points the other way. First, we must remember that
the case reached the Supreme Court of North Carolina on appeal
from a judgment of conviction rendered by a trial court after a jury
trial in Chowan County, North Carolina. This means that a district
attorney in Chowan County thought that John Mann's shooting of
Lydia was an indictable offense.87 It also means that a Chowan
County jury of white men, many of them slave owners," saw fit to
convict Mann of assault and battery for his violence against Lydia. If
the views of the district attorney and a unanimous Chowan County
jury are any indication of the zeitgeist, they would tend to show that
Thomas Ruffin's opinion missed it rather than reflected it. Ruffin
himself contended otherwise in Mann; he maintained that his ruling
was consistent with "the established habits and uniform practice of
the country," which indicated that absolute power of a slave owner
over a slave, even to the point of willful battery, was "requisite to the
preservation of the master's dominion."89 The history of the Mann
litigation itself suggests otherwise.
Ruffin went to great lengths in the Mann opinion to present its
outcome as foreordained. Because no statute explicitly criminalized a
slave owner's battery of his slave, Ruffin concluded that a court was
"forbidden" from recognizing that violent act as a common-law crime
through "a train of general reasoning on the subject."9  Ruffin
described himself as "compelled" to hold that,
while slavery exists amongst us in its present state, or until it
shall seem fit to the legislature to interpose express enactments
to the contrary, it will be the imperative duty of the Judges to
recognize the full dominion of the owner over the slave, except
where the exercise of it is forbidden by statute.91
Here too, however, Ruffin had more options than he admitted.
Just six years before Mann, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
held in State v. Hale that a man who was not the owner of a slave
could be indicted for battering that slave, even though no North
Carolina statute specifically criminalized battery of a slave by a non-
owner.92 Chief Judge Taylor's approach was nearly the opposite of
Ruffin's in Mann: "As there is no positive law decisive of the
87. See Hadden, supra note 12, at 8-9.
88. See Greene, supra note 24, at 722-27; TUSHNET, supra note 15, at 70.
89. State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263,265 (1829).
90. Id. at 267.
91. Id. at 268 (emphasis added).
92. State v. Hale, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 325, 325 (1823).
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question" before the court, Taylor reasoned, "a solution of it must be
deduced from general principles, from reasonings founded on the
common law, adapted to the existing condition and circumstances of
our society, and indicating that result, which is best adapted to
general expedience."93 This is precisely what Ruffin said a court was
"forbidden" from doing six years later in deciding whether the lessee
of a slave could be indicted for battery. State v. Hale certainly left
Ruffin the flexibility to reach a different result in State v. Mann, had
he wished to do so. The Hale decision undercuts any claim that Mann
was just a product of its time and culture.94
So does the dissenting opinion in the Virginia case of
Commonwealth v. Turner,95 a prosecution of a slave owner for
maliciously assaulting and battering his own slave.96 The General
Court of Virginia held that a slave owner could not be indicted at
common law for maliciously and excessively beating his own slave.
However, Judge William Brockenbrough filed a dissenting opinion in
which he contended that the owner of a slave could be indicted for
that common-law crime.97 Brockenbrough explicitly rejected the
claim-made by Ruffin in State v. Mann just two years later-that
only the legislature, and not common-law judges, could extend the
criminal prohibition of battery to slave owners. Common-law judges
in England could treat an attempt to commit any felony as a
misdemeanor, Brockenbrough noted, and judges in Massachusetts
could use the common law to allow an indictment for poisoning a
cow.98 Surely, then, "an [i]ndictment might be sustained in Virginia
93. Id. at 325-26.
94. The 1824 opinion of the Supreme Court of Virginia in Commonwealth v. Booth, 4
Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 394 (1824), also undercuts the idea that State v. Mann merely reflected the
culture of its time. The facts of Booth parallelled those of Mann: a jury in Petersburg,
Virginia, convicted a man of assault for excessively beating a slave whom he had leased for
a month. See id. at 194. The Supreme Court of Virginia overturned the conviction
because the language of the indictment was legally insufficient in failing to allege the
excessiveness of the lesee's punishment of the slave. See id. at 395. But the court was
careful to reserve judgment on the "grave and serious as well as delicate" question of
whether a lesee's temporary ownership of a slave conferred the authority to inflict an
excessive beating. See id. at 396. I thank Sally Greene for bringing the Booth case to my
attention.
95. 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 678 (1827) (Brokenbrough, J., dissenting).
96. For a useful discussion of the Turner case, see ANDREW FEDE, PEOPLE WITHOUT
RIGHTS: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE LAW OF SLAVERY IN
THE U.S. SOUTH 107-09 (1992); and THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND
THE LAW, 1619-1860, at 188-89 (1996).
97. Turner, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) at 686-90 (Brockenbrough, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 686-89.
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for maliciously and inhumanly beating a slave almost to death."99
This is not to say that Brockenbrough's position was the law in
Virginia on the question; it was just a dissenting opinion. But
Brockenbrough's dissent does show that Thomas Ruffin's contrary
position in State v. Mann was not foreordained by the culture of the
day: a well-respected Virginia judge who was Ruffin's first-cousin-
once-removed 00 and with whom Ruffin was known privately to
consult on legal questions relating to the law of slavery'0 ' took the
opposing position.
And there is, finally, the matter of Ruffin's language in State v.
Mann itself. If the outcome of Mann were merely a reflection of the
zeitgeist, Ruffin would have had no occasion to write anything more
than a simple opinion reciting the facts and applying the law. As we
know, though, that is not the sort of opinion that Ruffin wrote. He
filled his opinion with his "lamentations" and "feelings," with the
"struggle" in his "breast," with his "reluctance" to reach a result he
found "harsh[]" but to which he was "compelled," and with his
"happiness" that ameliorating social conditions were diminishing the
risk of a recurrence of the distasteful facts of the case. These are not
the words of a judge who believes his outcome foreordained and his
reasoning uncontroversial. State v. Mann itself therefore
demonstrates that Thomas Ruffin wrote with a nervous eye toward
the judgment of his contemporaries-contemporaries like his cousin,
Judge William Brockenbrough, who lived in the same historical
moment and the same culture as Ruffin, but who saw the world
differently and reached different conclusions about the institution of
slavery and the comparative roles of the courts and the legislature in
tempering it.
All of these factors help us see more clearly that the hindsight
defense misleadingly presents the past as a stream of monolithic
moments rather than moments of alternatives, debate, and choice.
Once we appreciate the contingency and diversity of the world in
which historical figures lived, we can begin to think more carefully
about how to evaluate the beliefs that those figures actually held and
the choices they actually made.
Happily, Thomas Macaulay's eloquent nineteenth-century essay
on hindsight offers a framework for this more careful and realistic
99. Id. at 689.
100. See 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS RUFFIN 27 n.1 (J.G. de Roulhac Hamilton ed.,
1918).
101. See Letter from William Brockenbrough to Thomas Ruffin (Feb. 7, 1831), in 2
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS RUFFIN, supra note 100, at 27-30.
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inquiry. Macaulay recognized that the dangerous effect of a careless
hindsight defense is to "put the best and the worst men of past times
on the same level.' 2 The proper questions to ask about those of a
prior generation, Macaulay argued, are "not where they were, but
which way they were going," whether "their faces [were] set in the
right or in the wrong direction," and whether they were "in the front
or in the rear of their generation."'' 3  To be sure, there is an
uncomfortable whiggishness to Macaulay's questions-a supposition
that the passage of time invariably leads to ever-greater wisdom,
morality, and achievement. One need not believe with Macaulay that
all historical motion is upward in order to appreciate the wisdom of
his observation that every generation has ample opportunity for
choice on the important questions of its day. Every generation has
greater and lesser figures, heroes and villains-and the hindsight
defense foolishly puts them all on the same level.
IV. THOMAS RUFFIN AND THE STRATEGY OF HINDSIGHT
There is an additional important problem with declining to judge
Thomas Ruffin for his opinion in State v. Mann out of concern for the
unfairness of hindsight. Whatever the merits of the hindsight defense,
Thomas Ruffin is in a uniquely poor position to assert it. In State v.
Mann, Ruffin used the passage of time as both a rhetorical device and
a substantive remedy. Time, he maintained, would ameliorate the
institution of slavery in ways that he, as a judge, could not. There is
reason to think that Ruffin was not particularly serious about this
prediction. But even if he was serious about it, we should not now
have to entertain a claim that the passage of time bars us from
judging him and his opinion.
In 1803, as a young man of sixteen, Thomas Ruffin left the South
to attend Princeton in New Jersey." 4  There he encountered a
different set of attitudes about the institution of slavery than those of
his boyhood in Virginia and North Carolina. In fact, the year after
Ruffin arrived at Princeton College, the New Jersey legislature passed
"An Act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery," a law providing that
female slaves born after July 4, 1804, would be free at age twenty-one
and male slaves born after that date would be free at age twenty-
102. MACAULAY, supra note 68, at 303.
103. Id. at 305.
104. William A. Graham, Life and Character of the Honorable Thomas Ruffin, in 1
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS RUFFIN, supra note 46, at 21 (J.G. de Roulhac Hamilton ed.,
1920).
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five. a°5 The young Ruffin was moved to write a letter to his father
expressing his concerns about the institution. Ruffin's letter to his
father does not survive, but his father's reply does, and in it, Sterling
Ruffin said to his son, "[Y]ou feel for [slaves], lament, greatly lament
their uncommon hard fate, without being able to devise any means by
which it may be ameliorated!""1 6 The elder Ruffin could envision
only one path to a more humane treatment of slaves: the passage of
time. He wrote:
[T]he fewer there are of this discription [sic] intermix'd with the
Whites, the more they are under our immediate eye, and the
more they partake of the manners and habits of the whites, and
thereby require less rigidness of treatment to get from them,
those services which are absolutely necessary for their support
and very existence. 1 7
Unfortunately, Sterling Ruffin explained to his son, "there are too
many with us to render a tolerably free intercourse of sentiment
possible.""1 8 But as the ratio of black slaves to whites decreased, "less
rigidness" would be possible.
This is a lesson that stayed with the young Thomas Ruffin. In
fact, when the time came in State v. Mann for the adult Thomas
Ruffin to opine on the criminal law's role in limiting brutality toward
slaves, he reproduced his childhood lesson almost verbatim.09 Ruffin
held, as we know, that a slave's obedience could be enforced only
through a permanent or temporary owner's "uncontrolled authority"
over the slave's body, even to the point of malicious battery.10 This
was a "harsh" proposition, Ruffin confessed, but "in the actual
condition of things, it must be so[; tihere is no remedy."''
What Ruffin meant, though, was that the courts could provide no
remedy. As his father had taught him twenty-five years earlier, the
passage of time would provide the remedy. "We are happy to see,"
Ruffin stated in the opinion, "that there is daily less and less occasion
105. See An Act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery, 1804 N.J. Laws 251 (1804),
available at http://njlegallib.rutgers.edu/slavery/acts/A78.html.
106. Letter from Sterling Ruffin to Thomas Ruffin (June 1804), in 1 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS RUFFIN, supra note 46, at 54.
107. Id. at 54-55.
108. Id. at 55.
109. The first to perceive the possibility of a connection between Sterling Ruffin's
advice and Thomas Ruffin's Mann opinion was Mark Tushnet. See TUSHNET, supra note
15, at 92 ("The structure of argument Ruffin's father developed bears an uncanny
resemblance to the structure of Ruffin's opinion in State v. Mann.").
110. State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 266 (1829).
111. Id.
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for the interposition of the Courts" to police a slave owner's
treatment of his slaves. 12 Existing statutes, the owner's profit motive,
and the community's censure of brutal slave owners were already
"produc[ing] a mildness of treatment and attention to the comforts of
the unfortunate class of slaves, greatly mitigating the rigors of
servitude and ameliorating the condition of the slaves." '113 And things
would only get better, Ruffin predicted: "The same causes are
operating and will continue to operate with increased action, until the
disparity in numbers between the whites and blacks, shall have
rendered the latter in no degree dangerous to the former, when the
police now existing may be further relaxed."".4 Here was his father's
lesson about the benefits of a declining ratio of black slaves to whites,
transformed into dictum in a judicial opinion. This result that his
father had predicted was "greatly to be desired," Thomas Ruffin said,
but could best be achieved through the "progress" of "events" rather
than by "rash expositions of abstract truths by a Judiciary tainted with
a false and fanatical philanthropy. '"15
In State v. Mann, Thomas Ruffin banked on the passage of time
as the only legitimate remedy for the brutality that inhered in the
institution of slavery as it then existed. "Be patient," Ruffin implied.
"A day will come when whites so outnumber black slaves that all
reason for violent correction will have disappeared. Then you will
look back and appreciate the rightness of this opinion, and
understand why we judges could not intervene to protect the slave
Lydia and others in her position."
It is possible that Ruffin genuinely believed this childhood lesson
and that he invoked it in State v. Mann in the best of faith. There is,
however, some reason to doubt that. More than twenty-five years
after Mann, in 1855, Thomas Ruffin was invited to give a speech to
the State Agricultural Society of North Carolina on the virtues and
advantages of North Carolina agriculture." 6 He included a lengthy
section on the excellence, productivity, and humaneness of slavery in
North Carolina. It is a remarkable oration, describing North
Carolina's slaves as a "humble, obedient, quiet and ... contented and
cheerful race of laborers" 7 and making the case that slave owners
112. Id. at 267.
113. Id. at 267-68.
114. Id. at 268.
115. Id.
116. See Address of Thomas Ruffin (Oct. 18, 1855) in 4 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
RUFFIN, supra note 1, at 323-37.
117. Id. at 334.
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bestowed a blessing on their slaves by continuing their bondage
rather than "turn[ing] them loose to their own discretion and self-
destruction." '118 But he made a special effort to demonstrate that
North Carolina's slave owners generally were not "ruthless and
relentless tyrants" who practiced "extraordinary severity" but rather
benign and gentle owners who cared for their slaves.119 The owner's
self-interest led him to be "observant of the health and morals of his
slaves; to care for them, and provide for them; to restrain them from
baneful excesses, and employ them in moderate, though steady
labor.""12 Incredibly, Ruffin cited as proof of North Carolina slavery's
essential humaneness the fact of the "increase in the numbers of our
slave population beyond the ratio of natural increase in the
population of any other nation."12' In State v. Mann, Ruffin argued
that the decline of the slave population over time was what would
guarantee their humane treatment. Twenty-five years later, he
argued that the hearty increase in the slave population proved that
slaves were well treated.
Thus, there is reason to suspect that Ruffin may have invoked his
father's lesson in State v. Mann as makeweight rather than as a
serious prediction about the future. Perhaps he invoked it because it
was a way to buy slavery some time and keep it out of the courts.
Perhaps he invoked it to blunt or silence the criticism of Mann that he
feared. But whatever Ruffin's reasons were for invoking the passage
of time as the chief remedy for the excesses of slavery in State v.
Mann, that is the choice that he made. He predicted that the
rightness and wisdom of Mann would be clear in hindsight. That is,
Ruffin invited hindsight, and profited from the invitation. Surely,
were he alive today, he would be in no position to complain about our
accepting his invitation.
V. THOMAS RUFFIN: SLAVE BATTERER, SLAVE TRADER, SLAVE
FAMILY BREAKER
I have argued thus far that the hindsight defense offers us little
help in taking the true measure of a historical figure and that,
whatever the merits of such a defense, Thomas Ruffin does not
deserve to invoke it. In place of the simplistic trope that we cannot
judge historical figures because "times were different then," I have
118. Id. at 330.
119. Id. at 332.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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suggested Thomas Macaulay's more nuanced inquiry into "not where
they were, but which way they were going," whether "they [were] in
the front or in the rear of their generation. "122 This inquiry, in
Thomas Ruffin's case, produces clear results. Thomas Ruffin was
much closer to the rear than the front of his generation on questions
relating to slavery.
This is a conclusion that the existing scholarship on Thomas
Ruffin has not reached largely for want of evidence. According to
Julius Yanuck, "Ruffin's papers reveal no ill-treatment of slaves." '23
Mark Tushnet reports more broadly that Ruffin's surviving
correspondence "reflect[s] a great deal of attention to politics, rather
less to personal matters, occasional references to domestic matters
such as purchasing seed and meat, and even fewer references to
slavery-itself perhaps an indication of the place slavery had in
Ruffin's psychological universe. ' 124 These scholars presumably relied
on the four-volume collection of Thomas Ruffin's papers published
between 1918 and 1920 by Ruffin's great-grandson, the historian J.G.
de Roulhac Hamilton. In the preface to his collection, Hamilton
asserted that his "guide in making the selection of the letters to be
printed" was "solely [his] desire to choose all such letters as may
throw light upon the history of the State and Nation, or upon the
personality and character either of Judge Ruffin or the writers.""12 It
might be more accurate to say that Hamilton's desire was to choose
those letters that threw a positive light on his great-grandfather-and
to exclude, for example, a letter such as Ruffin's to his wife on
January 29, 1833, in which he exclaimed that slaves were "creatures
[who] have no feeling or thought, one or the other," and that "the
conduct of negroes generally .. would lead one to the belief, that all
good feeling is banished from their bosoms. ' 126 In fact; Hamilton
omitted from the collection a great number of letters and other
materials that deal with slavery, including some that cast Thomas
Ruffin as a batterer and trader of slaves and a breaker of slave
families. 12
122. MACAULAY, supra note 68, at 305.
123. Yanuck, supra note 54, at 475.
124. TUSHNET, supra note 15, at 91.
125. J.G. de Roulhac Hamilton, Preface to 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS RUFFIN, supra
note 46, at 3.
126. Letter from Thomas Ruffin to Anne Ruffin (Jan. 29, 1833), in Thomas Ruffin
Papers (on file with the Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, The University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill) [hereinafter Thomas Ruffin Papers].
127. Many of these omitted materials form the basis of Parts VI(A), VI(B), and VI(C)
of this Article. The materials themselves are located in the Thomas Ruffin Papers
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A. The Battery of Bridget
Thomas Ruffin owned ten slaves when he married in 1811 and
thirty-two by 1830.28 His law practice in the 1810s and 1820s and his
judicial duties between around 1830 and 1860 kept him on the road
for long periods; as a result, he left most of his plantation affairs,
including the management and discipline of his slaves, to overseers. 129
At least since the publication of Jean Bradley Anderson's The
Kirklands of Ayr Mount,3 ' the literature has reflected the fact that
Ruffin knew that his overseers treated his slaves brutally."' For
example, in 1824, Ruffin's friend and former teacher Archibald D.
Murphey alerted Ruffin to his overseers' "evil and barbarous
Treatment of [his] Negroes," including the "barbecu[ing], pepper[ing]
and salt[ing]" of one of them.13 2 And this was not the only time
Ruffin received such warnings.'33 Ruffin's archived papers, which
contain many more letters to Ruffin than from him, do not reveal how
Ruffin responded to this information about his overseers.
But Ruffin's papers do reveal an episode that shows Ruffin's own
brutality-a brutality that was probably tortious and may have been
criminal. The story began in January of 1830, just a month before
Ruffin heard the appeal in State v. Mann.' Ruffin owned two North
Carolina plantations-one in Rockingham County and one called the
Hermitage in Alamance County.135 The Hermitage had originally
belonged to Archibald D. Murphey, but by the early 1820s Murphey
owed so much money to Ruffin and others that he was forced to sell
the property to Ruffin in order to reduce the debt.'36 He struggled to
reclaim it through the rest of the 1820s,'37 and his wife continued to
archived in the Southern Historical Collection at the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill.
128. Hadden, supra note 12, at 5.
129. See id. at 5-6.
130. JEAN BRADLEY ANDERSON, THE KIRKLANDS OF AYR MOUNT (1991).
131. See id. at 52-53.
132. Letter from A.D. Murphey to Thomas Ruffin (June 3, 1824), in Thomas Ruffin
Papers, supra note 126.
133. See Hadden, supra note 12, at 6.
134. See id. at 8.
135. See Manuscripts Department, Library of the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill, Biographical Note, Inventory of the Thomas Ruffin Papers, 1753-1898,
http://www.lib.unc.edu/mss/inv/r/Ruffin,Thomas.html#dOe402 (last visited Feb. 25, 2009).
136. John A. McGeachey, A Dreamer's Speculations: The Financial Plight of
Archibald D. Murphey, May 2002, http://www4.ncsu.edu/-jam3/admurphey.htm.
137. See id.
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live there as the Ruffins' guest.138 However, a final financial reversal
late in 1829 forced Murphey to turn the Hermitage over to Ruffin for
good, 3 ' and early in November of that year, he was imprisoned in
Greensboro for debt for several weeks.14 After his release, Murphey
returned briefly to the Hermitage on the Haw River 4' but then
moved for the rest of the winter to Greensboro. 142 His wife remained
behind at the Hermitage. 143
Before leaving for Greensboro, the ailing Murphey pleaded with
Ruffin to allow him to take along a slave of Ruffin's named Bridget:
If you knew or had any idea of my afflicted condition, you
would not deny my request as to Bridget .... I cannot expect
Cornelia' 44 to remain with me long, and when she is gone I shall
be left dependent upon those who know not how to nurse me,
or take care of me in my sufferings. I appeal to your generosity
on this subject, and to your sympathy for a human Being, who
has suffered and is probably long doomed to suffer the extreme
of human wretchedness.
If our Friendship does not entitle me to this small Boon at
your Hands, let my affliction prefer its claim. I declare to you
that I had rather be dead than to be deprived of all chance of
good nursing in my sufferings. One thing is certain, I should
quickly die. Let me therefore entreat you not to deprive me of
Bridget, if I can make out to pay you for her.145
As it happened, Ruffin had his own plans for Bridget, and they
did not include Archibald Murphey. For reasons that the historical
record does not reveal, Murphey's wife, who continued to live at the
Hermitage, detested Bridget,'46 and Ruffin himself saw her as a bad
138. See Letter from Thomas Ruffin to Archibald D. Murphey (Oct. 29, 1831), in
Thomas Ruffin Papers, supra note 126 (referring to Mrs. Murphey's residence with the
Ruffin family).
139. See McGeachey, supra note 136.
140. See id.; see also Letter from Archibald D. Murphey to Thomas Ruffin (Nov. 17,
1829), in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS RUFFIN, supra note 46, at 523 n.1.
141. See Letter from Archibald D. Murphey to Thomas Ruffin (Jan. 13, 1830), in 1
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS RUFFIN, supra note 46, at 537-38.
142. See Letter from V.M. Murphey to Thomas Ruffin (Feb. 10, 1830), in 1 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS RUFFIN, supra note 46, at 538.
143. See Letter from Thomas Ruffin to Archibald D. Murphey, supra note 138.
144. Cornelia was a slave who principally served Murphey's mother or mother-in-law.
See Letter from V.M. Murphey to Thomas Ruffin, supra note 142.
145. Letter from Archibald D. Murphey to Thomas Ruffin, supra note 141.
146. One possibility that suggests itself is, of course, an emotional or sexual
relationship between Murphey and Bridget. The archival record is, not surprisingly, silent
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influence on the rest of his slaves. As Ruffin later explained in a
letter to Murphey, Bridget "was the aversion [and] terror to the
highest degree of all the relations of the mother of [Murphey's]
children" and was of a "detestable character" who Ruffin feared
"would impair the value of her descendants, whom I owned; not to
speak of the other slaves which I got from you over part of which she
had great influence.' 1 47 So eager was Ruffin to get rid of Bridget that
he had tried to make arrangements "to sell her at a great distance"
and had instructed his agent that if he could not sell her, he should
give Bridget away to any man who would promise that she would
"not be sold or live short of a thousand miles from" the Hermitage. 48
Moved by Murphey's plea for Bridget, Ruffin abandoned these
plans to ship her off to parts unknown and instead decided to give her
to his ailing friend outright and by deed, without payment. 49
Murphey later reported that he understood that Ruffin did not want
Bridget returning to the grounds of the Hermitage, 50 but Ruffin's
feelings in fact ran even deeper than that. Ruffin had written to
Murphey:
I did never expect, [that Bridget] would be permitted to annoy
me in any way much less that the feelings of the venerable
Matron, who honor me and mine by her residence with us [and]
of the ladies of my family would be outraged by having her
brought here, nor that the value of my negroes would be
impaired by a permitted intercourse between them and a
person of this woman's character, temper, disposition towards
me [and] mine, habits of life, dress, indulgences, [etc.].'
Thomas Ruffin really did not like the slave Bridget.
Ruffin was therefore furious when, toward the end of October of
1831, he learned that Bridget had been spotted on the grounds of the
Hermitage. 5 "With the view of punishing her contumacy and
defending my rights of property," Ruffin explained to Murphey, he
"endeavored to find her[,] but she was gone."' 53 He instructed his
on that possibility, except for the evidence cited here of Mrs. Murphey's distaste for
Bridget and her husband's intense desire for her companionship in his illness.
147. Letter from Thomas Ruffin to Archibald D. Murphey, supra note 138.
148. Id.
149. See id.; see also Letter from Archibald D. Murphey to Thomas Ruffin (Jan. 24,
1830), in Thomas Ruffin Papers, supra note 126.
150. See Letter from Archibald D. Murphey to Thomas Ruffin (Dec. 21, 1831), in
Thomas Ruffin Papers, supra note 126.
151. Letter from Thomas Ruffin to Archibald D. Murphey, supra note 138.
152. See id.
153. Id.
[Vol. 87
JUDGING THOMAS RUFFIN
overseer to whip her if he could find her, but when the overseer found
her, she maintained that she had come to the Hermitage with
Murphey as his servant, so the overseer did not whip her.'54 When
Murphey left the Hermitage the next day, Ruffin told Murphey,
Bridget "remained prowling about my plantation or near it," which
had a very unsettling effect on the rest of Ruffin's slaves.155
On the morning of Saturday, October 28, 1831, Ruffin took a
walk toward the mill buildings at the Hermitage and happened upon
Bridget "posted at the bridge." '156 According to Ruffin, Bridget "gave
[him] a look of insolent audacity which Patience itself could not
swallow."'57  Ruffin had had enough. "Upon the instant," Ruffin
reported to Murphey, he "gave her a good caning.""15 That is, Judge
Ruffin of the Supreme Court of North Carolina assaulted Murphey's
slave Bridget, beating her with some sort of rod.
The legal ramifications of this assault were potentially serious,
and Ruffin, having recently authored State v. Mann, undoubtedly
knew it. Bridget did not belong to Ruffin; he had given a deed for her
to Murphey more than a year before the assault. Neither was Ruffin
Bridget's hirer, as John Mann was Lydia's in State v. Mann. As a
white non-owner and non-hirer, Ruffin therefore arguably had only
the rights of what the law called a "stranger" in relation to Bridget,159
and a stranger's rights were few. Under North Carolina law of the
day, at a minimum, a stranger's assault on the slave of another
exposed the stranger to liability in damages to the slave's owner. 160
Murphey therefore likely had a cause of action against Ruffin for the
tort of trespass.
Even criminal liability was not out of the question. As discussed
earlier,"' in the 1823 case of State v. Hale, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina held that a white man who beat the slave of another
could be indicted at common law for battery. 62 A slave's provocation
154. See id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See State v. Hale, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 582, 584 (1823).
160. See generally Williams v. Averitt, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 308 (1824) (concerning an
action in trespass for beating of the slave of another); Hale, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) at 589 ("An
assault and battery is not indictable in any case to redress the private injury, for that is to
be effected by a civil action. ); Richardson v. Saltar, 4 N.C. (Car. L. Rep.) 505 (1817)
(holding that members of a patrol party who were not themselves official patrollers were
liable in trespass for beating the slave of another).
161. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
162. See Hale, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) at 583.
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of the violence could provide the accused batterer with a defense, and
the Hale court recognized that "many circumstances which would not
constitute a legal provocation for a battery committed by one white
man on another would justify it if committed on a slave, provided the
battery were not excessive." '163 This was an allusion to the court's
1820 observation in State v. Tacket that while mere words could not
amount to legal provocation in a confrontation between two white
men, they might suffice as provocation when uttered by a slave.164
Bridget, however, did not say a word. She merely gave Ruffin a look
that he did not like. No reported case in North Carolina (or
elsewhere) treated a look askance from a slave as legal provocation to
battery.'65
In Southern Slavery and the Law 1619-1860, Thomas D. Morris
reports that North Carolina followed Virginia law in permitting the
owner of a plantation to whip a slave "if [the slave] was on the land
without written permission from his owner or had not been sent on
some lawful business. ' 166 If this was so, and if Bridget was actually on
Ruffin's property when he came upon her,167 then perhaps Ruffin had
the legal right to cane her. Yet Morris's reading of the relevant North
Carolina statute may be mistaken. It authorized a landowner to
administer a "severe whipping" to a slave who came onto his land
with a dog, gun, or weapon unaccompanied by a white person, or who
"travel[led] from his master's land by himself" along any but "the
most usual and accustomed road.' 16 It is certainly not clear that this
163. Id. at 586.
164. See State v. Tacket, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 103, 107, 109 (1820).
165. In a much later case, State v. Bill, 35 N.C. (13 Ired.) 254 (1852), the Supreme Court
of North Carolina noted that it was "impossible to define" the "acts in a slave toward a
white person" that would "amount to insolence," though it listed "a look, the pointing of a
finger, a refusal or neglect to step out of the way when a white person is seen to approach"
as examples of insolence. Id. at 257. These forms of insolence were, the court suggested,
adequate reasons to bring a slave before a magistrate for possible punishment. Id. The
Bill case did not, however, establish that these were valid reasons for a non-owner to
engage in self-help and inflict a caning himself. See id.
166. MORRIS, supra note 96, at 197, 482 n.66.
167. Ruffin wrote to Murphey that Bridget was "posted at the bridge" when he came
upon her. Letter from Thomas Ruffin to Archibald D. Murphey, supra note 138. It is
impossible to be certain whether this was on or off Ruffin's property, although the
property did straddle both the Haw River and the Great Alamance Creek. Perhaps the
"bridge" to which Ruffin refers in this letter was a bridge across one of those; if so, Bridget
would have been on Ruffin's property at the time he beat her. On the other hand, Ruffin
stated in the letter that Bridget had been spotted "prowling about [his plantation] or near
it," which leaves open the possibility that she was not on his property at the time of the
beating. Id. (emphasis added).
168. JOHN HAYWOOD, A MANUAL OF THE LAWS OF NORTH-CAROLINA 518 (1819).
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statute authorized Thomas Ruffin to beat Bridget with a cane for
being at the Hermitage and looking at him wrong.
And even if the statute permitted such violence, Thomas Ruffin
himself did not seem to know it. The very day of the incident, Ruffin
sat down to write a long letter to Murphey.'69 Ruffin obviously knew
that word of the caning would get back to him, and he nervously
sought Murphey's assurance that he would pursue no legal remedy.
One of his purposes in writing, Ruffin explained, was to "to avow to
you as the owner of this woman, the force I have used to her. If you
think she merited only what she got, I shall be gratified at the concord
of our views."17  On the other hand, said Ruffin, "[s]hould my
conduct meet your disapproval, the more obvious is the propriety of
the exposition I have made of it."'' Ruffin closed the letter by
expressing "the hope ... that [Murphey would] find no cause of
complaint against" him, but he did not defend himself by citing any
common-law or statutory right to beat Bridget. l7 2 Murphey let Ruffin
twist a bit before replying; only two months later, on December 21,
1831, did Murphey write to Ruffin that his "floging [sic] Bridget ha[d]
given [him] no offense. '" 173
This single episode, heretofore unknown in the literature, does
not transform Thomas Ruffin into one of the monsters of his time,
though his assault must have scarred Bridget and may have left her
permanently impaired. The episode does, however, supply important
context about the capacity for brutality in the judge who presented
himself to the public as so deeply distressed by the harshness of State
v. Mann. Sally Hadden wrote of Thomas Ruffin that "[a]s the son of
a minister who taught his son to care for his slaves personally but
whose job forced him to leave them in the hands of brutal overseers,
Ruffin's conscience must have been pricked, just a little, by the Mann
opinion. ',174 Ruffin's beating of Bridget at the Hermitage not long
after the Mann decision calls such an assessment of the quality of
Ruffin's conscience into question.
B. Speculating on Human Beings
Sally Hadden was the first scholar to bring to prominent light
Thomas Ruffin's involvement in the slave-trading business in the
169. Letter from Thomas Ruffin to Archibald D. Murphey, supra note 138.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Letter from Archibald D. Murphey to Thomas Ruffin, supra note 150.
174. Hadden, supra note 12, at 11.
2009]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
1820s. 175 She sensibly maintained that it was difficult to reconcile
Ruffin's willingness to engage in the trade in slaves with the idea that
Ruffin was sincere in his professed paternalism toward them. 176 She
also surmised that Ruffin abandoned the slave-trading business at the
death of his business partner because he had come to see that his
"neighbors or colleagues found his activities in the trade
distasteful. '17  But because she viewed Ruffin's slave-trading
partnership as very financially rewarding, she suggested that his
reasons for engaging in the slave trade may have been "only financial
at heart" rather than reflecting anything deeper about his moral
vision.178
Again, the full record of Ruffin's involvement in the slave trade
complicates this picture.'79 Ruffin was exposed to blunt disapproval
of his participation in the slave trade shortly after beginning it, but he
continued it anyway, even while serving as a superior court judge.
And it is difficult to see Ruffin's slave trading principally as a remedy
for financial distress; the partnership's financial records make clear
that Ruffin was a speculator in the slave trade, not someone who
depended on its profits.
Thomas Ruffin was the primary equity partner in the two-man
slave-trading partnership he set up with Benjamin Chambers. 80
Ruffin's papers do not reveal how Ruffin and Chambers first met,
although they do show that the two men had an attorney-client
relationship that predated the 1822 launch of their slave-trading
business by some two years.' Their venture was actually two
175. See id. at 7-8. Hadden was not the first to note Ruffin's involvement in the slave-
trading business; Jean Bradley Anderson briefly described it in her 1991 book The
Kirklands of Ayr Mount. ANDERSON, supra note 130, at 52.
176. Hadden, supra note 12, at 8.
177. Id. at 7.
178. Id. at 8.
179. This full record includes Ruffin's correspondence from his partner Benjamin
Chambers from 1821 to 1826 and from others relating to the wrapping up of Chambers's
estate after his death in 1827, two partnership agreements between Ruffin and Chambers,
Ruffin's day books detailing his expenditures and income between 1821 and 1831, the
partnerships' accounting ledger, and annual inventories of slaves purchased and sold for
two of the five years that the business operated. But cf Hadden, supra note 12, at 7
("[R]ecords of the [Ruffin-Chambers] partnership are scanty.").
180. Ruffin invested $4,000 in the partnership at its start; Chambers invested $2,000
and devoted his slave Dick to the enterprise. See Articles of Agreement between
Benjamin Chambers and Thomas Ruffin (Oct. 26, 1821), in Thomas Ruffin Papers, supra
note 126.
181. See Letter from Benjamin Chambers to Thomas Ruffin (Aug. 18, 1820), in
Thomas Ruffin Papers, supra note 126. In a much earlier letter, a client of Ruffin's sought
advice on whether to pursue a collection action against a "Benjamin Chambers," but it is
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successive partnerships-one that the two men created in October of
1821 for a three-year term, and a second that they created in June of
1825 for a two-year term that was cut short by Chambers's death in
March of 1827.182 The partnership's business model was simple: they
would buy slaves in the Upper South, transport them to the Deep
South, and sell them there at a profit.183 Ruffin provided two-thirds of
the first partnership's capital of $6000; Chambers provided the other
$2000 and did all of the buying, transporting, and selling of slaves."
The capitalization of the second partnership was also $6000, but
Ruffin provided all of it; Chambers contributed only his sweat equity
and the labors of his slave Dick to that venture.8 5
Michael Tadman has argued persuasively that the nineteenth-
century Southern slave trader was not the pariah in white Southern
society that Northern abolitionists and some Southern slavery
defenders made him out to be. 8 6 Yet there can be little question that
trafficking in slaves was not seen as an affirmatively honorable
trade 87 and that those men like Thomas Ruffin who managed to rise
to positions of high station in Southern society did so despite their
slave-trading rather than because of it.'88 Surely there were very few
judges in the 1820s who trafficked in slaves on the side. Yet this is
impossible to know whether this was the same Benjamin Chambers with whom Ruffin
ultimately went into the slave-trading business. See Letter from John Johnston to Thomas
Ruffin (Feb. 5,1814), in Thomas Ruffin Papers, supra note 126.
182. See Articles of Agreement between Benjamin Chambers and Thomas Ruffin,
supra note 180; Articles of Agreement between Benjamin Chambers and Thomas Ruffin
(June 15, 1825), in Thomas Ruffin Papers, supra note 126. Chambers died on March 21,
1827, in Abbeville, South Carolina, after a long illness; Ruffin learned of his partner's
death in a letter from the administrator of Chambers's estate about a week later. See
Letter from A.B. Arnold to Thomas Ruffin (Mar. 27, 1827), in Thomas Ruffin Papers,
supra note 126.
183. This was a very common trading pattern in the 1820s. See MICHAEL TADMAN,
SPECULATORS AND SLAVES: MASTERS, TRADERS, AND SLAVES IN THE OLD SOUTH 41
(1989).
184. See Articles of Agreement between Benjamin Chambers and Thomas Ruffin (Oct.
26, 1821), supra note 180.
185. See Articles of Agreement between Benjamin Chambers and Thomas Ruffin
(June 15, 1825), supra note 182.
186. See TADMAN, supra note 183, at 179-210.
187. See KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE
ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 239 (1956) (noting that the "traffic in slaves.., was offensive not
only to abolitionists but also to many of slavery's stanchest [sic] defenders."); TUSHNET,
supra note 15, at 88 ("In the 1820s slave trading was not an entirely respectable occupation
among honorable men of the South.").
188. See TADMAN, supra note 183, at 192-200. But cf. STAMPP, supra note 187, at 268
("[I]t was not at all uncommon for merchants or bankers in the towns of the Upper South
to act as silent partners of the speculators[, and] many respectable commission merchants,
factors, general agents, and lawyers engaged in a little slave trading as a side line.").
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what Thomas Ruffin did. He agreed to serve as a judge of the
Superior Court of North Carolina in the summer of 1825, just days
after he formally renewed his slave-trading partnership with
Benjamin Chambers with a new infusion of cash. 189
The first partnership agreement that Ruffin drafted in 1821 hints
at his awareness of the dishonor attached to slave-trading: he
included a provision that "the whole business of buying and selling is
to be conducted by ... Chambers ... and is to be carried on in the
name of said Chambers alone.""19  We cannot know exactly why
Ruffin did not want his name attached to his business's slave-trading
activities, but worries about the their dishonor seem a likely
explanation. And even if the potential dishonor of the slave trade
was not apparent to Thomas Ruffin before he launched his business,
it became clear in a letter he received shortly thereafter. The letter
came from a man named Quinton Anderson of Caswell, North
Carolina, whom Ruffin had invited to join in the slave business,
presumably as an additional investor. Anderson declined Ruffin's
invitation, and given Ruffin's prominence, might have been expected
to do so diplomatically. Anderson was instead blunt: "I have after
giving the subject mature consideration, come to the conclusion that
the situation of my business forbids that I should embark in business
of that nature, not the least consideration with me, is the trafic [sic]
itself, against which the feelings of my mind in some measure revolt. 191
This letter leaves no doubt that Thomas Ruffin knew he was
embarking on a business venture that some of his peers morally
condemned.
Yet the literature has suggested that Ruffin was willing to take
this step because he was financially strapped and the slave trade
permitted him to "address[] his financial problems."1" Here too, the
full archival record complicates the accepted story. Thomas Ruffin's
overall financial situation was unquestionably precarious by around
189. See Articles of Agreement between Benjamin Chambers and Thomas Ruffin
(June 15, 1825), supra note 182. On Ruffin's agreement to serve as a superior court judge,
see 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS RUFFIN, supra note 46, at 326 n.1, 327. Mark Tushnet has
noted that Ruffin "was not formally a trader in slaves when he became a supreme court
judge." TUSHNET, supra note 15, at 88. This is true, but it misses the important fact that
Ruffin was formally a slave trader when he became a superior court judge.
190. Articles of Agreement between Benjamin Chambers and Thomas Ruffin (Oct. 26,
1821), supra note 180 (emphasis added). The second partnership agreement, signed in
June of 1825, had the same provision. Articles of Agreement between Benjamin
Chambers and Thomas Ruffin (June 15, 1825), supra note 182.
191. Letter from Quinton Anderson to Thomas Ruffin (Jan. 15, 1822), in Thomas
Ruffin Papers, supra note 126.
192. TUSHNET, supra note 15, at 88.
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1820 because he stood as a surety on sizeable debts of his friend and
former teacher Archibald D. Murphey that Murphey was having an
increasingly difficult time paying.1 93 Yet Ruffin's papers reveal no
true sense of panic until December of 1821, when Murphey was
arrested and jailed for nonpayment of a note. At that moment, and
for a time thereafter, Ruffin's papers reflect anxiety on Ruffin's part
that Murphey's financial problems might swamp him as well. 194
But by the time this crisis arrived, Ruffin was already in the
slave-trading business. He had launched it on October 20, 1821-
some six weeks before Murphey's arrest and its economic ripple
effects. 95  Ruffin had $4,000 of cash on hand to capitalize the
business, as well as $300 extra that he was able to advance to
Chambers so that he could buy Ruffin an additional "negro boy. 196
Furthermore, in June of 1825, when Ruffin launched his second slave-
trading partnership with Chambers with a cash investment of $6,000,
Ruffin was not in dire financial straits. In fact, almost simultaneously
with setting up the new slave-trading business, Ruffin left his
comparatively lucrative private practice of law in order to take a
lower-paying state trial court judgeship." 7 The claim that Ruffin
started and then stayed in the slave business principally because it
was a business whose profits helped him deal with his "precarious"
financial situation 9' thus appears overstated.
This is not to deny that Ruffin's slave-trading business was at
least initially quite profitable. At the settling of the affairs of the first
Ruffin-Chambers partnership in June of 1825 after three years of
business, Ruffin got back his initial investment of $4,000 along with a
193. See McGeachey, supra note 136; see also Letter from John Fitzhugh May to
Thomas Ruffin (Nov. 9, 1821), in Thomas Ruffin Papers, supra note 126 (expressing
concern over Ruffin's "situation" as surety on Archibald D. Murphey's debts, but
expressing confidence that "with the advantages that [Ruffin] possess[ed]," he would
"have no occasion to despair").
194. See Letter from Thomas Ruffin to Solomon Debow (Jan. 10, 1822), in Thomas
Ruffin Papers, supra note 126 ("You have probably heard from some of your friends in
this part of the Country of the total ruin of our worthy friend Archibald D. Murphey Esq.
& of the very large sums of money which I have paid and shall have to pay as his surety-
they are of such magnitude as to induce in me serious apprehensions of meeting with the
same fate which has befallen him.").
195. See Thomas Ruffin, Daybook Entry (Oct. 20, 1821), in Thomas Ruffin Papers,
supra note 126.
196. Id.
197. See Letter from A.D. Murphey to Thomas Ruffin (July 13, 1825), in 1 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS RUFFIN, supra note 46, at 327 ("Your Profits may be less: but you
will be able to scuffle through the difficulties.").
198. Hadden, supra note 12, at 7.
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profit of nearly $5,500.199 He more than doubled his money in three
years. That good fortune, however, did not last. In the second
partnership, Ruffin reinvested his original $4,000 investment from the
first partnership along with nearly a third of the first partnership's
profits. Here Ruffin lost quite badly. He did not even see the full
return of his initial investment on the 1825 partnership, let alone a
profit; he put $6,000 into the partnership and got back only $4,094.2oo
Ruffin wrote to his wife of his despondency over this loss in June of
1827:
I find that the man who owed me money2 1 has left but little to
pay with & that I am likely to lose, probably, two or three
thousand dollars-a circumstance not very pleasant at any time,
but particularly unwelcome in the present limited state of my
income. What I shall get will also be probably some time in
coming. I do not know but that this loss is the chief cause of the
fatigue I experience; but I am really almost broken down.20 2
Thus, to the extent that Ruffin was looking to his slave-trading
business as a salve for financial distress, he was sorely disappointed;
his overall cash investment of $10,000 over a five-year period netted
him a total gain of only about $3,500,203 or less than six percent on an
annualized basis.
199. See Thomas Ruffin Ledger Book, Entry 127, in Thomas Ruffin Papers, supra
note 126.
200. See id.
201. That Ruffin did not refer to Chambers by name or as his slave-trading partner
raises the tantalizing possibility that he concealed his involvement in the slave-trading
business even from his own wife.
202. Letter from Thomas Ruffin to Anne Ruffin (June 25, 1827), in Thomas Ruffin
Papers, supra note 126.
203. This calculation clears up some inaccuracies in the scholarship. Sally Hadden
reported that "Ruffin's notes show that the partnership turned more than a $6,000 profit
during a three-year period." Hadden, supra note 12, at 7 (emphasis added). Apparently
relying on Hadden's numbers, Mark Tushnet wrote that "Ruffin invested four thousand
dollars in the initial purchase of slaves, and eventually he made a profit of about six
thousand dollars in the slave-trading venture." TUSHNET, supra note 15, at 88. Hadden's
number appears to be too small and Tushnet's too large. Ruffin's ledger reflects that the
1821 partnership produced profit to him in the amount of around $5,500, see Thomas
Ruffin Ledger Book, Entry 127, supra note 199, but the partnership's profits would have
been double that, because the partnership agreement provided that the partnership's
profits were to be "equally divided" between Chambers and Ruffin. See Articles of
Agreement between Benjamin Chambers and Thomas Ruffin (Oct. 26, 1821), supra note
180. If Ruffin received about $5,500 in profits, then the 1821 partnership's profits must
have been in the vicinity of $11,000. Tushnet's characterization of Ruffin's success in the
slave-trading business appears to have confused Hadden's erroneous statement of the
1821 partnership's profits with the amount that Thomas Ruffin "eventually... made ... in
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The crucial point, however, is this: Thomas Ruffin's ledger book
and day books reveal that he did not look to his slave-trading business
as any sort of salve for financial distress. Notwithstanding the profit it
achieved, Ruffin never took so much as a penny in cash from his first
slave-trading partnership between October of 1821 and June of
1825.2' He simply allowed the money to sit in the hands of Benjamin
Chambers-in the form of cash and slaves-as Chambers wandered
the East Coast for over three years. In June of 1825, when Ruffin
finally received a profit from the first partnership, he rolled more
than a third of it along with his original investment back into the
second partnership. This was not a man who, in Mark Tushnet's
words, "addressed his financial problems by trading in slaves. ' 2 5 He
did not get into the business of trafficking in human beings, or stay in
it once he had started, in order to make ends meet, or to offset losses
from other faltering investments and enterprises on whose income he
and his family depended. Thomas Ruffin got into the slave-trading
business as a speculator, plain and simple.
C. Breaking Up Slave Families
Thomas Ruffin's career as lawyer, plantation owner, and judge
coincided with what scholars have called the "paternalist" or
"domesticating" era of American slavery. This was a time when slave
owner narratives came to reflect a "domesticating mission to sponsor
among slaves the virtues of the 'Victorian family' ,206 and pro-slavery
propaganda maintained that "masters were emotionally attached to
their slaves [and] encouraged the institution of the family among
them. '27  In this world of supposed emotional attachment and
"family values," the break-up of slave families-husbands from wives,
children from parents-was something to avoid. Slave owners,
moved by their own gentle and protective emotions toward their
slaves, would be expected to try to keep slave families together.
This paternalism shows up in Thomas Ruffin's judicial writing
around the time of State v. Mann. In Cannon v. Jenkins,2°s a case that
the slave-trading venture." TUSHNET, supra note 15, at 88. This article shows that Ruffin
actually made only about $3,500 on a total investment of $10,000.
204. Both his ledger and his day books make this clear; at no point between the
founding of the partnership in October of 1821 and its settlement in June of 1825 is there
any indication of any partnership payment to Ruffin.
205. TUSHNET, supra note 15, at 88. Though the quoted words are Tushnet's, he
makes clear that the underlying claim is Sally Hadden's. See id.
206. TADMAN, supra note 183, at 9.
207. Id. at 111.
208. 16 N.C. (1 Dev. Eq.) 245 (1830).
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the Supreme Court of North Carolina decided just a few months after
Mann, the question was whether an estate administrator fraudulently
sold four slave brothers as a single lot to a bidder with whom he had
allegedly colluded. Ruffin upheld the sale but noted in extended
dictum that "[m]ost commonly the articles sell best singly; and
therefore, they ought, in general, to be so offered."2 °9 Separate sales
were normally what "must be done if the executor discovers that the
interest of the estate requires it; for he is not to indulge his charities at
the expense of others."21 But Ruffin could not fully associate himself
with a rule that counseled the forcible separation of four young
brothers. Echoing the language of his then-recent opinion in State v.
Mann, he acknowledged that "[iut would certainly have been harsh to
separate these four boys and sever ties which bind even slaves
together."21' He therefore softened his stance, avowing that if an
executor sold four slave brothers as a group rather than singly, "the
Court would not punish him for acting on the common sympathies of
our nature unless in so doing he hath plainly injured those with whose
interest he stands charged." '212
Ruffin's tone in Cannon v. Jenkins is very much of a piece with
that of State v. Mann: Ruffin-the-judge articulates the tough rule of
the law while Ruffin-the-man avows the "harshness" of the law's
result and its inconsistency with the feelings that arise from "the
common sympathies of our nature." But when it came to protecting
slave families, Ruffin's own actions repeatedly belied the paternalistic
and sensitive tone of his judicial writings. Thomas Ruffin repeatedly
broke up slave families or kept them apart, even in the face of moving
evidence that his harshness took a severe emotional toll on his slaves.
Nowhere was this more starkly apparent than in Ruffin's
involvement in the slave trade. In the accounting that Benjamin
Chambers sent to Ruffin for the partnership's trades in 1823 and
1824, Ruffin saw that their transactions included "Mary a girl [of] 15,"
bought for $150 and sold for $375; "Mindy a girl [of] 15," bought for
$260 and sold for $380; "Eliza a girl [of] 13," bought for $175 and sold
for $390; "Patty a girl [of] 13," bought for $150 and sold for $300; "Jo
a boy [of] 11," bought for $160 and sold for $375; and "Kathrine a girl
209. Id. at 247.
210. Id. at 248.
211. Id. (emphasis added); cf. State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 266 (1829) ("I most
freely confess my sense of the harshness of this proposition.") (emphasis added).
212. Cannon, 16 N.C (1 Dev. Eq.) at 248.
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[of] 11," bought for $140 and sold for $300.213 The partnership's 1825
transactions included "Little Charles," a boy of 10, and his "2 cisters
[sic] younger," whom Chambers bought for $500 and sold for $825;
and Winny, a girl of 9, whom Chambers bought for $240 and sold for
$310.214 These were not children bought and sold with their parents
or (except in the case of "Little Charles" and his "2 cisters [sic]") with
their siblings; they were children that the partnership bought and sold
alone.2" Each and every one of these sales separated children from
parents, siblings from siblings, or both.
Yet Ruffin had emotional distance from these transactions; his
partner Chambers was the one who bought these children,
transported them south, and sold them. One might therefore expect
that Ruffin was more tender with the slaves he knew. But often he
was not. For example, in 1852, a neighbor of Ruffin's offered him
$150 for a slave named Noah who had been Ruffin's for many years
and who was married to another of Ruffin's slaves.216 Ruffin told his
wife to have someone ask Noah whether he wanted to be sold; 217 his
daughter soon reported that Noah was "extremely anxious to spend
the remnant of his pilgrimage here on earth in the society of his
beloved better half. '218  Ruffin disregarded Noah's preference and
sold him for $150. When the time came for the slave to leave the
Ruffin plantation, Ruffin's daughter Sally reported to her father that
"Old Uncle Noah ... disliked parting very much.
219
Not surprisingly, Ruffin showed no greater compassion for the
family relations of the slave Bridget, whom he caned for giving him
an insolent look in the fall of 1831. Before 1829, Ruffin owned both
Bridget and her daughter. When Archibald Murphey asked Ruffin
for Bridget at the end of that year, Ruffin, who had been planning to
sell Bridget so that she would "not live short of a thousand miles"
away from his plantation and her daughter, agreed to give her to
213. See An Acct of the Purchase and Sale of Slaves Made by Benjamin Chambers,
(1823), in Thomas Ruffin Papers, supra note 126; Sale of Negroes in South Carolina and
Georgia, (1824), in Thomas Ruffin Papers, supra note 126.
214. See Purchase of Negroes, (July 1825), in Thomas Ruffin Papers, supra note 126;
Sale of Negroes in Alabamma [sic], (1825), in Thomas Ruffin Papers, supra note 126.
215. In those cases where Chambers bought and sold a family group-siblings, or a
parent with children-he noted this explicitly in his accounting.
216. Letter from Thomas Ruffin to Anne Ruffin (Jan. 3, 1852), in Thomas Ruffin
Papers, supra note 126.
217. See id.
218. Letter from Sally Ruffin to Thomas Ruffin (Jan. 11, 1858), in Thomas Ruffin
Papers, supra note 126.
219. Letter from Sally Ruffin to Thomas Ruffin (Jan. 17, 1852), in Thomas Ruffin
Papers, supra note 126.
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Murphey instead. But he explained to Murphey that a person of
Bridget's "character, temper, disposition toward me and mine, habits
of life, dress, indulgences, etc." would "corrupt" her daughter and
"impair" the daughter's value to him. He therefore insisted that
Bridget have no contact with her daughter and forbade them "to
meet or have any intercourse" whatsoever.22°
Ruffin was similarly cold-hearted in rejecting another slave
owner's effort to reunite a slave with his wife. In July of 1838,
William Hooper of Pittsboro, North Carolina, proposed to sell Ruffin
a slave named November, whose wife was a seamstress to Ruffin's
wife Anne. "He seems to think his fate a hard one," wrote Hooper,
"that he can go only once a month to see his wife, and then have to
walk such a distance or hire a horse" in order to make the trip.22'
Hooper explained that November had been "in the service of the
College" (presumably the University of North Carolina) but was no
longer engaged there and "would do better in the country near his
wife. ' 222  November was "sound & strong," "honest & sober,"
Hooper assured Ruffin, and "a good house servant. ' 223 Hooper asked
Ruffin at least to "hire him for the rest of the year, or the next
year, '224 if he was not willing to buy him outright, so that November
and his wife could be reunited.
Thomas Ruffin was dismayed by Hooper's request. In a letter to
his wife notifying her of Hooper's request, Ruffin avowed that he had
"determined never to increase my cares & troubles by any addition to
any dependents or property of that species. ' 225 However, Ruffin
noted ruefully,
[I]t is one of the obligations, as well as curses, on those who
stand in the relation of master to that unhappy race, whether to
part with one, altho' a good servant, or to purchase another,
perhaps worthless, or, at the least, not wanted, rather than sever
the tie of supposed affection, or the cohesion which unites
them. 26
220. See Letter from Thomas Ruffin to Archibald D. Murphey, supra note 138.
221. Letter from William Hooper to Thomas Ruffin (July 11, 1838), in Thomas Ruffin
Papers, supra note 126.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Letter from Thomas Ruffin to Anne Ruffin (July 13, 1838) in Thomas Ruffin
Papers, supra note 126.
226. Id.
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He told his wife that he feared that this "supposed affection" of
November for his wife would make it impossible for the Ruffins to
"resist" November's wishes, and that if they complied and it turned
out that November "did not suit" life on the Ruffin plantation, there
"would be no such thing as getting clear of him, without sending her
with him., 2 7 Ruffin told his wife that he believed he could find "an
excuse for declining" Hooper's request on the basis that November's
"habits" would "not at all suit the situation in which he desires to
place himself-where he must work" and must "lose the opportunity
of traffic & merry making., 228 "My own [wish] is to say promptly
nay,, 2 9 Ruffin told his wife, but he asked her for her opinion before
responding to Hooper. Five days later, Ruffin's daughter Alice
responded on her mother's behalf, saying that "whatever [Ruffin]
decide[d] on the matter" would be "entirely satisfactory to her
[mother]," and that her mother had "no wish on the subject" apart
from her husband's. 23 ° The archival record does not contain Ruffin's
reply to Hooper's request, but it seems safe to presume that Ruffin
declined. He made clear in his letter to his wife that his wish was to
decline unless his wife disagreed, and his financial papers reflect no
purchase of a slave in 1838.231 Ruffin, it appears, kept November and
his wife apart.
Perhaps the most heart-wrenching of the family separations that
Ruffin's surviving papers disclose was one related to his slave-trading
partnership with Benjamin Chambers. The first partnership
agreement between Chambers and Ruffin recites that Chambers
contributed to the enterprise "a Negro man slave called Dick about
28 years old, at the price of five hundred Dollars.2 132  At the
settlement of the first partnership, Chambers "retained ... Negro
Dick and also his part of the profits, 233 but that same day, when
Ruffin and Chambers signed their second partnership agreement,
they stipulated that "Chambers is to attend to the business himself &
fund his assistants, that is to say, his slave Dick & two horses & a
227. Id. (emphasis added).
228. Id.
229. Id. (emphasis in original).
230. Letter from Alice Ruffin to Thomas Ruffin, (July 18, 1838), Thomas Ruffin
Papers, supra note 126.
231. It must be noted that the extant records for 1838 are considerably sketchier than
those for earlier years. Those records that do exist are in the Thomas Ruffin Papers, supra
note 126 (Box 43, Folder 669).
232. Articles of Agreement between Benjamin Chambers and Thomas Ruffin (Oct. 26,
1821), supra note 180.
233. Settlement Agreement (June 15, 1825), in Thomas Ruffin Papers, supra note 126.
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carry-all or waggon out of his own means & without further
compensation than by his part of the profits." '234
Benjamin Chambers thought highly of his servant Dick-so
highly, in fact, that he tried to give Dick his freedom. In his will,
Chambers stated that it was his "wish that my faithful servant Dick on
account of his meritorious service rendered to me shall be taken by
my executor to North Carolina and there set free; provided his
freedom cannot be accomplished, I wish him to be sold to some good
man near his family." '235 As death approached, Chambers became
even more intent on reuniting Dick with his family in North Carolina.
He instructed his physician, who had also prepared his will, that in the
event of his death, the doctor should give Dick a pass to go to North
Carolina to be near his family.236 Shortly after Chambers died on
March 21, 1827, his physician wrote to Ruffin to inform him of the
death. "His servant Dick is very anxious to go to North Carolina to
[be] near his family," the doctor wrote. But the doctor explained that
he had thought it better not to follow Chambers's instructions and
give Dick a pass because "no such instructions [were] mentioned in
the will" and he was therefore "fearful of laying [himself] liable. 237
Ruffin, whom Chambers had named executor of his will, traveled
to Abbeville, South Carolina, where Chambers had died, about ten
weeks later. There he renounced the office of executor and spent
time trying to collect the property of the slave-trading partnership.238
Ruffin learned that Chambers had left little of value behind and that
he was therefore likely to lose "two or three thousand dollars" on his
investment. 239 Ruffin then returned to North Carolina. He ignored
Chambers's desire that Dick should be freed and allowed to return to
234. Articles of Agreement between Benjamin Chambers and Thomas Ruffin (June 15,
1825), supra note 182.
235. Last Will and Testament of Benjamin Chambers, (Nov. 28, 1826), in Abbeville
County Estate Papers (on file with the South Carolina Department of Archives and
History). Chambers may have been from North Carolina; we know that he owned land in
Hillsborough, North Carolina, see Letter from Benjamin Chambers to Thomas Ruffin
(March 30, 1822), in Thomas Ruffin Papers, supra note 126, and that he referred to a trip
through North Carolina as a chance to pass through his "old naborhood" [sic] and see "a
few of [his] friends." Letter from Benjamin Chambers to Thomas Ruffin (May 21, 1824),
in Thomas Ruffin Papers, supra note 126. If Chambers was in fact from North Carolina,
then it would stand to reason that Dick, his personal servant, was also from North
Carolina.
236. Letter from A.B. Arnold to Thomas Ruffin (March 27, 1827), in Thomas Ruffin
Papers, supra note 126.
237. Id.
238. See Renunciation of Office of Executor (June 18, 1827), in Abbeville County
Estate Papers (on file with the South Carolina Department of Archives and History).
239. Letter from Thomas Ruffin to Anne Ruffin, supra note 202.
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his family in North Carolina. Instead, Dick remained in Abbeville
awaiting appraisal and sale.
On August 6th, appraisers examined Dick and estimated his
value at $375 .24 That same day, Dick was offered at public auction in
Abbeville, South Carolina, alongside another slave of Chambers's
named Harriett, a horse, and a baggage wagon.241 A man listed on the
sale bill as J.C. Martin purchased Dick at a hammer price of $360.242
Thanks to Thomas Ruffin, Dick was not freed and did not even
make it back to North Carolina to be with his family.243
CONCLUSION
Was Thomas Ruffin a man of "honour," of "humanity," and of
"the kindest and gentlest feelings" who was "obliged to interpret ...
severe laws with inflexible severity," 2" as Harriet Beecher Stowe saw
him? Did State v. Mann truly open a "severe" "struggle" in Ruffin's
"own breast" between his "feelings as a man" and his "duties as a
Magistrate?, 245  Did Ruffin "feel" the "harshness" of the result in
State v. Mann "as deeply as any man can?, 246
The full archival record-rather than the sanitized one
bequeathed to scholars by Ruffin's great-grandson-provides a much
clearer negative answer to all of these questions than the literature
has thus far reached. Thomas Ruffin engaged in the slave trade
purely as a speculator at a time when that business was uncommon
among men of his station, and he continued the trade while he sat on
the state court bench. Thomas Ruffin battered a slave named Bridget
for giving him an insolent look. And he either sold or otherwise kept
many slaves of all ages-including some even younger than age
nine-away from their parents, brothers, sisters, and children. The
full archival record shows that on matters relating to chattel slavery,
Thomas Ruffin was certainly not among the better men of his
generation and may have been among the more ruthless.
240. Appraisal, Estate of Benjamin Chambers (Aug. 6, 1827), in Abbeville County
Estate Papers (on file with the South Carolina Department of Archives and History).
241. Sale Bill, Estate of Benjamin Chambers (Aug. 6, 1827), in Abbeville County
Estate Papers (on file with the South Carolina Department of Archives and History).
242. Id.
243. I assume here that Dick's purchaser, J.C. Martin, was not a North Carolinian who
traveled all the way to Abbeville, South Carolina for this particular estate sale.
244. STOWE, THE KEY TO UNCLE TOM'S CABIN, supra note 43, at 133.
245. State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263,264 (1829).
246. Id. at 266.
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As Thomas Babington Macauley saw, the hindsight defense
leaves no room for better and worse people in a generation; it insists
that our ancestors lived in a "time" when "people" thought, felt, and
acted in some particular way that characterized their era. The
hindsight defense flattens the past and the people who lived in it,
stripping prior generations of their diversity and their lives of
contingency, and generalizes their colorful experiences into
monotone and monolith. The rich and sobering details of Thomas
Ruffin's life as a slave owner and slave trader therefore show us just
how unhelpfully generic the hindsight defense can be. The large
archival record that is available to us takes us beneath the surface of
the past-a surface loyally polished by Ruffin's great-grandson. We
quickly find that Ruffin lived a life of choices on slavery that were
contestable even in his own time.
Worries about hindsight therefore give us little reason to refrain
from judging Thomas Ruffin for his opinion in State v. Mann. The
past may be "another country," but a full review of Ruffin's surviving
papers shows that he chose to live in one of that country's more
backward-looking regions.
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